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ence of the debt, and the debtor can assert against the subrogee any
defenses he had against the original creditor.32 If the subrogation is
partial, the debtor can require the joinder of both the partial subrogor
and the partial subrogee, avoiding the possibility of multiple suits.3
Thus, even in cases of partial subrogation, the debtor is not preju-
diced and the court correctly viewed his lack of consent as immater-
ial.
Susan Kelly
CONTRIBUTION IN NON-COLLISION MARITIME CASES
Sessions, a longshoreman, was employed by Mid-Gulf Steve-
dores, Inc. to load a vessel in the Port of Houston. While walking atop
cargo previously loaded in Mobile by Cooper Stevedoring Co., he
stepped into a concealed gap, sustaining injury. Thereafter, Sessions
recovered damages from the vessel and the vessel sought contribution
from Cooper Stevedoring. In affirming the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals,I the United States Supreme Court held that contribution is
permissible between joint tortfeasors in non-collision maritime cases
if the party against whom contribution is sought is not immune from
liability by statute. Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Fritz Kopke, Inc., 417
U.S. 106 (1974).
32. E.g., St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Gallien, 111 So. 2d 571 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1959); Motor Ins. Corp. v. Employers' Liability Assurance Corp., 52 So. 2d 311
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1951); International Paper Co. v. Arkansas & Louisiana M. Ry. Co.,
35 So. 2d 769 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1948). Since the subrogee is subject to all defenses
available to the debtor against the original creditor, and the subrogee can recover only
the amount expended, a third party will seldom pay the debt of another and request a
conventional subrogation from the original creditor, unless it is in his own interest to
do so. While the general contractor in the instant case could have let the supplier file
his lien, requested that the subcontractor bond the lien, and paid the supplier only in
case the subcontractor refused, it was more advantageous to the general contractor to
keep the supplier from filing the lien. See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts
for the 1973-1974 Term-Security Devices, 35 LA. L. REv. 321, 325-26 (1975), discussing
the instant case.
33. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 697 provides: "An incorporeal real right to which a person
has been subrogated, either conventionally or by effect of law, shall be enforced judi-
cially by: (1) the subrogor and the subrogee, when the subrogation is partial; or (2)
the subrogee, when the entire right is subrogated." The official comment to the article
indicates that both the partial subrogee and the partial subrogor are necessary parties
to a suit enforcing the subrogated claim, and the defendant waives his exception unless
he timely objects to the nonjoinder of a necessary party. Since in most cases the debtor
will be able to join both partial subrogee and partial subrogor, the instant case poses
no significant impediment to judicial economy.
1. Sessions v. Fritz Kopke, Inc., 479 F.2d 1041 (5th Cir. 1973).
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In maritime law, the rule of contribution or division of damages
between joint tortfeasors in collision cases is one of ancient origin.'
However, in Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling and Refitting Co. ,'
the United States Supreme Court refused to allow contribution be-
tween joint tortfeasors in a non-collision case.4 The Halcyon rule has
affected two lines of factually distinguishable cases. One line of cases
involves basically the same fact situation as arose in Halcyon:5 the
party against whom the shipowner sought contribution was the plain-
tiff's employer who was exempt from tort liability under the Long-
shoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act.6 Even in such
situations, before the 1972 amendments to the Act,7 the strict rule of
no-contribution was circumvented by the doctrine of Ryan Steve-
doring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S. S. Corp.' which allowed a shipowner an
action in indemnity against the longshoreman's employer based on a
breach of an implied contractual obligation to perform in a safe man-
ner.'
2. The North Star, 106 U.S. 17 (1882). See also The Chattahochee, 173 U.S. 540
(1899); The Atlas, 93 U.S. 302 (1876); The Alabama, 92 U.S. 695 (1875); The Washing-
ton, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 513 (1869). See generally Staring, Contribution and Division of
Damages in Admiralty and Maritime Cases, 45 CALIF. L. REv. 304, 305 (1957).
3. 342 U.S. 282 (1952).
4. "[lit is established admiralty doctrine that the mutual wrongdoers shall share
equally the damages sustained . . . . This maritime rule . . . has been applied in
many cases, but this Court has never expressly applied it to non-collision cases." Id.
at 284. Accord, Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953). But cf. American
Stevedores, Inc. v. Porello, 330 U.S. 446 (1947) (referred to in Halcyon as "only inci-
dental," 342 U.S. at 284 n.5); White Oak Transp. Co. v. Boston, Cape Cod & New York
Canal Co., 258 U.S. 341 (1922); Atlee v. Pocket Co., 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 389 (1874).
5. Plaintiff, longshoreman, brought an action for unseaworthiness (see Seas Ship-
ping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946)) against the shipowner who, in turn, was denied
contribution from the negligent employer of plaintiff, because he was immune from
suit by statute. See, e.g., Italia Societa per Azioni di Navigazione v. Oregon Stevedor-
ing Co., 376 U.S. 315 (1964); Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co. v. Nacirema Operating Co., 355
U.S. 563 (1958); Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953).
6. 33 U.S.C. § 905(a) (Supp. 1972) provides in part: "The liability of an employer
prescribed in section 904 of this title shall be exclusive and in place of all other liability
of such employer to the employee, his legal representative, husband or wife, parents,
dependents, next of kin, and anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages from such
employer at law or in admiralty on account of such injury or death, ... "
7. The 1972 amendment to the Act foreclosed the possibility of an action for
indemnity against the employer by providing that an "employer shall not be liable to
the vessel for such damages directly or indirectly and any agreements or warranties to
the contrary shall be void." 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (Supp. 1972). See Cooper Stevedoring
Co. v. Fritz Kopke, Inc., 417 U.S. 106, 113 n.6 (1974).
8. 350 U.S. 124 (1956).
9. See, e.g., Federal Marine Terminals, Inc. v. Burnside Shipping Co., Ltd., 394
U.S. 404 (1969); Italia Societa per Azioni di Navigazione v. Oregon Stevedoing Co.,
[Vol. 35
NOTES
The second line of cases affected by Halcyon involves an impor-
tant distinction: the party against whom contribution was sought was
not immune by statute from suit by the plaintiff. Under these cir-
cumstances the courts were confronted with whether the broad pro-
hibition against contribution in non-collision cases announced in
Halcyon should be invoked to prevent contribution or whether the
Halcyon holding should be limited to its particular facts.10 Some
federal courts strictly applied the language of Halcyon to exclude
contribution," although in some instances expressly questioning the
equity of such a decision." In prohibiting contribution, courts echoed
the Supreme Court's reservations in Halcyon'" about taking judicial
initiative in light of anticipated complexities in administering contri-
bution and determined that any solution should await Congressional
action.' 4 Some of these courts were also influenced or confused by
common law concepts barring contribution between joint tortfea-
sors.'5 The inequitable result of the failure to distinguish Halcyon
from cases involving no statutory employer immunity was that, as
between mutual wrongdoers, the party against whom the plaintiff
chose to bring suit was forced to bear the entire burden.
On the other hand, the Second Circuit, in In re Seaboard Ship-
376 U.S. 315 (1964); Waterman S.S. Corp. v. Dugan & McNamara, Inc., 364 U.S. 421
(1960); Weyerhaeuser S.S.' Co. v. Nacirema Operating Co., 355 U.S. 563 (1958).
10. See generally Staring, Contribution and Division of Damages in Admiralty
and Maritime Cases, 45 CALIF. L. REv. 304, 345 (1957).
11. See, e.g., Mendez v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 421 F.2d 851 (3d Cir. 1970);
Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Gulf Ref. Co., 230 F.2d 346, 354 (5th Cir. 1956);
Wilkinson v. Yamashita-Shinnihon Kisen, K.K., 366 F. Supp. 110 (D. Md. 1973);
Coggins v. James W. Elwell & Co., 356 F. Supp. 612 (E.D. Pa. 1973); In re Standard
Oil Co., 325 F. Supp. 388, 390 (N.D. Calif. 1971); Dingler v. Halcyon Lines, 305 F.
Supp. 1, 2 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
12. "It is ironic that admiralty, normally so hospitable to equitable principles,
should deny contribution except in a strictly limited category of 'collision' cases. But
this is the doctrine of [Halcyon]." Mendez v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 421 F.2d 851,
854 (3d Cir. 1970) (Freedman, J., concurring).
13. Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282, 285
(1952).
14. See, e.g., Saus v. Delta Concrete Co., 368 F. Supp. 297, 298-99 (W.D. Pa.
1974); In re Standard Oil Co., 325 F. Supp. 388, 390 (N.D. Calif. 1971).
15. "We reiterate the view . . . that Halcyon merely reflects the long standing
maritime rule which, like the common law, bars contribution between joint tortfea-
sors." In re Standard Oil Co., 325 F. Supp. 388, 390 (N.D. Calif. 1971) (emphasis
added). See also Simpson Timber Co. v. Parks, 390 F.2d 353, 356 (9th Cir. 1968). See
generally 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS, § 10.2 (1956); W. PROSSER, THE
LAW OF TORTS, § 50 (1971); Bohlen, Contribution and Indemnity between Tort-feasors,
21 CORN. L.Q. 552 (1936).
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ping Corp.6 and the Fifth Circuit, in Horton & Horton v. TIS J.E.
Dyer" and Watz v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.,'8 distinguished Halcyon
and allowed contribution where the joint tortfeasor from whom it was
sought was not exempt by statute.'" According to the Second Circuit,
Halcyon concerned an area of law covered by the Longshoremen's and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act and thus was "inapplicable in
cases where the joint tort-feasor against whom contribution is sought
is not immune from tort liability by statute."' The Fifth Circuit used
similar logic in distinguishing Halcyon.2'
The instant case, which was an appeal from the Fifth Circuit's
application of the Horton and Watz exceptions to Halcyon, limited
Halcyon to its particular facts. The decision in Kopke to allow con-
tribution even in non-collision cases when neither of the joint tort-
feasors is insulated from liability by statute will eliminate the dispar-
ity of approach which has characterized the lower court decisions. 3
However, the question of how contribution is to be effected remains
unanswered. In collision cases, although the equal division of dam-
ages is a well established rule, 5 it has been criticized" because it
16. 449 F.2d 132, 139 (2d Cir. 1971), noted in 21 J. PuB. L. 479 (1972).
17. 428 F.2d 1131 (5th Cir. 1970).
18. 431 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1970).
19. "Regardless of whether we consider the restrictive language of Halcyon as
dictum or determine that it should be confined to its own particular facts. . . we agree
• . .that the Halcyon doctrine is not applicable here." Horton & Horton, Inc. v. T/S
J.E. Dyer, 428 F.2d 1131, 1134 (5th Cir. 1970). See also Hurdich v. RCA Corp., 359 F.
Supp. 1222 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Dow Chemical Co. v. Tug Thomas Allen, 349 F. Supp.
1354 (E.D. La. 1972); Armstrong v. Chambers, 340 F. Supp. 1220 (S.D. Tex. 1972);
Coca-Cola Co. v. S.S. Norhalt, 333 F. Supp. 946 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
20. In re Seaboard Shipping Corp., 449 F.2d 132, 139 (2d Cir. 1971).
21. Watz v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 431 F.2d 100, 120 (5th Cir. 1970).
22. Suit was commenced prior to the 1972 amendments to the L.H.W.C.A., 33
U.S.C.A. § 905(b) (Supp. 1972) which prohibits' actions against the shipowner based
on absolute liability for unseaworthiness; thus, the amendments were inapplicable.
Cooper Stevedoring v. Fritz Kopke, Inc., 417 U.S. 106, 107 n.1 (1974). However, the
result would have been affected only to the extent that the vessel's liability was based
on no-fault liability for "unseaworthiness," leaving the rule announced still viable.
23. See notes 11, 19 supra.
24. See Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Fritz Kopke, Inc., 417 U.S. 106, 108 n.3 (1974):
"[W]e have no occasion in this case to determine whether contribution in cases such
as this should be based on an equal division of damages or should be relatively appor-
tioned in accordance with the degree of fault of the parties."
25. See, e.g., The Catherine v. Dickinson, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 170, 177-78 (1855);
Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 597, 603 (1963); Movible Offshore,
Inc. v. M/V Wilken A. Falgout, 471 F.2d 268, 274 (5th Cir. 1973); In re Bloomfield S.S.
Co., 422 F.2d 728, 735 (2d Cir. 1970). An unsuccessful attempt to divide damages by
comparative fault can be found in N.M. Paterson & Sons, Ltd. v. City of Chicago, 209
F. Supp. 576 (N.D. Il1. 1962), rev'd, 324 F.2d 254 (7th Cir. 1963).
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forces parties disproportionally at fault to share the damages
equally." At the same time, apportionment of fault has been allowed
in order to mitigate damages in non-collision cases involving injuries
to contributorily negligent maritime plaintiffs.18 In spite of the ob-
vious equitable advantages, considerations of judicial efficiency 9
make it uncertain whether apportionment of damages based on a
proportional degree of fault will be utilized in effecting contribution
pursuant to the Kopke decision. Even those courts allowing contribu-
tion before Kopke consistently divided the damages equally2 ° How-
ever, because of the Supreme Court's refusal to decide this issue, the
question remains open and may produce differing results in the lower
courts.
Len Kilgore
The United States Supreme Court in Union Oil Co. v. The San Jacinto, 409 U.S.
140, 141 (1972), granted certiorari "to consider petitioner's request that we abandon
the divided damages rule," but found no liability on the part of one vessel and did not
reach the issue of damages.
26. Dwyer Oil Transp. Co. v. The Edna M. Matton, 255 F.2d 380, 383 (2d Cir.
1958); Ahlgrem v. Redstar Towing & Transp. Co., 214 F.2d 618, 620-21 (2d Cir. 1954).
See generally G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRATY, § 7-20 at 438 (1957)
[hereinafter cited as GILMORE & BLACK].
27. The inflexibility of dividing damages equally when one party's degree of fault
greatly outweighs the other has been tempered somewhat by the "major-minor fault
doctrine" designed "to relieve a party whose fault was only technical from the harsh-
ness of the divided damages rule" by releasing the party whose fault was only "minor."
Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. Mobile Drilling Barge, 424 F.2d 684, 690 (5th
Cir. 1970). See also The City of New York, 147 U.S. 72 (1893). See generally GILMORE
& BLACK § 7-4, at 402-03.
28. See, e.g., Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953); Socony-Vacuum
Oil Co. v. Smith, 305 U.S. 424, 431 (1939); The Arizona v. Anelich, 298 U.S. 110 (1936).
29. One commentator in considering judicial efficiency as an argument against
apportionment of damages has determined: "[T]he proportional negligence rule...
seems in principle and in operation more just than the cruder ...rule of divided
damages. The only objection that really has any plausibility is the one based on the
difficulty of assigning degrees of fault in exact percentages. The answer is, of course,
that judges would simply approximate, as best they could, as is done every day in other
cases in matters of amount of damages, degree of disability, etc. An attempt at a
division on the basis of degree of fault would at least not be foredoomed to go badly
wrong in a large number of cases, as is the present rule." GILMORE & BLACK § 7-20 at
439.
30. E.g., In re Seaboard Shipping Co., 449 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1971); Watz v. Zapata
Off-Shore Co., 431 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1970); Horton & Horton v. T/S J.E. Dyer, 428
F.2d 1131 (5th Cir. 1970).
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